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From the Chairman
When I came up to Clare, there were 
70 applicants to read Philosophy. 
34 were accepted. That was 1985. 
This year 308 applied, but just 56 
were successful. This is not a blip. 
Since 2002 Philosophy’s application/
acceptance ratio has been way above
the overall University average, and
higher still than the average in the Arts. 
Why is Philosophy so popular? One
explanation is that the subject is now
firmly on the map in schools, as 
a GCSE and A-level option, often as 
a substantial element in the teaching 
of Religious Studies. Over 23,000 
UK students took Religious Studies or
Philosophy A-level last year, more than
French and German combined. This is
reflected in the changing intellectual
formation of our undergraduates: 2/3
of our current freshers have studied
Philosophy in some form at A-level. 
But why Philosophy at Cambridge? 
It doesn’t take much investigation to
discover that we offer a Rolls-Royce
education.  Nowhere in the world can
match it. And it will be even stronger
this coming year when Tim Crane 
and Fraser MacBride join the Faculty. 
I know first-hand that they are
inspirational teachers. 
Mastering facts and figures is one 
of the first chores for an incoming
Chairman, but the principal pleasure 
is sustaining and developing our
dynamic community. The Faculty
simply couldn’t operate without the
goodwill and superb work of its
extended network of philosophers –
Junior and Senior Research Fellows,
College Teaching Officers, Affiliated
Lecturers, Directors of Studies, not 
to mention our army of top graduate
students. I’ll end this note with a 
tribute to all of them.
Alex Oliver 
Chairman, Philosophy Faculty Board
Emeritus Professor D.H. (Hugh)
Mellor, who in 2008 celebrated his
70th birthday, originally studied
chemical engineering at Pembroke
College. Although he had developed
an interest in philosophy at school in
Manchester, Hugh did not formally
study the subject until he visited the
University of Minnesota as a Harkness
Fellow. There he took a course on the
philosophy of science taught by the
great Vienna Circle empiricist Herbert
Feigl. Feigl began his course by
announcing that there are three kinds
of philosophy: ‘the philosophy of
nothing but’ (needless reductionism),
‘the philosophy of something more’
(mysticism and spirituality) and Feigl’s
own preferred middle way, ‘the
philosophy of what’s what’.
‘The philosophy of what’s what’
might make a good subtitle for Hugh’s
collected papers. It nicely captures
both his unpretentious, down-to-earth
attitude towards the subject, and his
respect for the facts revealed to us 
by common sense and by science.
Although Hugh started off as a
philosopher of science, leaving his 
job at ICI to work on his PhD on
probability with Mary Hesse in HPS,
most of his work (and certainly his
best work) has been in metaphysics.
When I wrote something for 
the excellent Festschrift edited by
Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra and
Hallvard Lillehammer in 2003 (Real
Metaphysics), I commented that a
dominant theme of Hugh’s work is
what I called his ‘objectivism’ about
metaphysics. This is his view that the
subject-matter of metaphysics is the
way it is regardless of what anyone
thinks about it. In the philosophy of
probability, Hugh defended single-case
objective chances or propensities; in
the philosophy of time he defended 
the reality of the temporal series
ordered in terms of earlier and later,
and argued that the ‘now’ is a kind 
of illusion. In the philosophy of 
mind, Hugh argued against those 
like Thomas Nagel who think that the
self is something outside the objective
order of the world. Our metaphysics
should not mix facts about the way 
we represent the phenomena with 
the phenomena themselves.
This is perhaps more of a
‘philosophy of philosophy’ than you
would get from Hugh himself. Hugh
tended to be impatient with people
who speculated about the essence of
philosophy, thinking this a question 
of as little interest as the question 
of the essence of science. “I’m not
interested in philosophy” he would
sometimes say “I’m interested in 
time, causation, probability, the 
mind …”. Philosophy is its own 
thing: there is truth and falsehood in
philosophy; the truth can be attained;
and our philosophical questions are,
on the whole, about exactly what they
seem to be about: time, causation,
probability, the mind and so on.
D.H. Mellor
Tim Crane
D.H. Mellor
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When I was a research student 
in the 1980s, Hugh was one of the
dominant figures in the Cambridge
scene. Tireless, tough and energetic 
as a graduate supervisor, he also gave
inspiring undergraduate lectures and
he was a formidable opponent at the
Moral Sciences Club. Many visiting
speakers came away from meetings
with their papers in severe need of
reconstruction (I know that mine 
did). We coined the Philosophers’
Lexicon-style definition: hughmellorate
(verb, transitive) = to show a visiting
speaker that their paper is completely
worthless. But Hugh did not do this 
to score points; he wanted to get to 
the heart of the matter, without any
waffle and without affectation.
Some found Hugh just too dogmatic
in those days, and even those who
didn’t would sometimes poke fun at
him affectionately. I remember Jeremy
Butterfield in a lecture describing a view
about time as what Hugh believes, and
adding: “He won’t tell you he believes
it. He’ll tell you it’s true. That’s his way
of saying he believes it”. And a friend
summed up Hugh’s inaugural lecture,
The Warrant of Induction in two
sentences: “How do we know the future
will be like the past? Because it will!”.
It was odd, in a way, that Hugh
should give his inaugural lecture on
epistemology, which is not an area 
of philosophy in which he had much
interest. The inaugural is a fine piece,
but his greatest achievements have
been in metaphysics: in particular in
the philosophy of time (Real Time
was published in 1980, and the heavily
revised version Real Time II in 1998)
and in causation, where his dense 
and condensed book The Facts of
Causation (1995) argued for some
very radical doctrines, for example 
the view that causation is not a
relation. These works surely belong
among the best works of metaphysics
of the late twentieth century.
Hugh’s work in metaphysics fits
squarely into a Cambridge tradition
which is hard to define but easy 
to recognise – a tradition which in 
the 20th century included Bertrand
Russell, F.P. Ramsey, C.D. Broad and
R.B. Braithwaite. Hugh has always
said how much he owed to Ramsey,
but he also owed a lot to Ramsey’s
friend Braithwaite, who would also
become a friend of Hugh’s. He also
claims as his other influences Hans
Reichenbach, and the Australian
metaphysics of J.J.C. Smart, D.M.
Armstrong, Frank Jackson and 
David Lewis.
Hugh’s substantial achievements in
philosophy should not over-shadow
the enormous amount he has also 
done for the Faculty and the
University. He was the prime mover 
in the ambitious redesign of the Raised
Faculty Building, and he also served as
Pro-Vice Chancellor, managing to do
at least three times as many things in 
a day than most academics. Since he
retired, Hugh has taken a well-earned
break from all this kind of thing
(though not from philosophy, publishing
his philosophical introduction to
probability a few years ago) and has
been spending more and more time 
on his other great passion, the theatre.
To his students, Hugh is a model 
of how to take philosophy seriously
without being solemn about it; 
how to have high standards in the
subject without being crippled by 
the enormity of the problems or 
the weight of the tradition; how to
take account of the known facts
without slavish devotion to science;
and how the first and guiding aim of
philosophers should be to aim to say
what is true, without fuss and without
obscurity. The philosophy of what’s
what, in other words.
Tim Crane (PhD 1989), Professor 
of Philosophy, UCL. He joins the
Faculty as Knightbridge Professor 
in September 2009
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An Oxford Lad at Cambridge
Sidney A. Josephs
I came up to Trinity in 1957, on a
Cambridge Bursary for Adult students,
to read Moral Sciences (Neither moral
nor scientific!). I was 24 years old and
had been working on the production 
line in one of the Oxford car factories.
I had become interested in philosophy
at the age of 16, when I started seeking
logical arguments to support my
empirical atheism.
I was fortunate, from 1954–56, to
attend, in Oxford, a Workers’ Education
Association evening class in philosophy
tutored by Thomas Hodgkin (husband
of the more famous Dorothy), and it 
was he who persuaded me to compete
for the Cambridge Bursary.
From my limited, untutored 
outside view, Oxford philosophy in 
the early and mid 1950s appeared to be
exclusively linguistic analysis, with bits
of Wittgenstein grafted on, and I was
surprised when I arrived in Cambridge
to discover that Wittgenstein was talked
about, but not obviously taught, and
that metaphysics and objective values
still lived through A.C. Ewing.
My supervisor for two of my years
was Casimir Lewy, very strong on
symbolic logic, less persuasive on
linguistic analysis, but always enjoyable
and productive, and a truly lovely man.
For a couple of terms I was supervised
firstly by Ewing (I don’t think either 
of us much enjoyed the experience!), 
and another term by a graduate student
named Ian Hacking, who if I remember
correctly, brewed beer in his sink, which
he shared with his supervisees (the 
beer, not the sink).
Moral Sciences was a small faculty
then: in 1958 only 19 students sat 
the five papers that constituted the
Preliminary Examination for Part I 
of the Moral Sciences Tripos. I was
awarded the only First, and there were
eight 2.1s, ten 2.2s, and no Thirds. 
As a consequence of my Part I
performance, Trinity elected me to a
Senior Scholarship, and (I suspect it 
was at the instigation of Lewy) I was
elected as Honorary Secretary of 
the Moral Sciences Club (the first
undergraduate to be elected to this post
for many, many years, so I was told).
I persuaded a number of then well-
known philosophers to speak, (including
Saw, Mrs Warnock, Peters, Winch,
Findlay, Montefiore, and Flew) but my
biggest coup was to get A.J. Ayer for 3rd
March 1960. Normally, meetings were
held in Professor Braithwaite’s rooms in
King’s, but for Freddie’s visit the meeting
was held in Trinity Junior Parlour, to
accommodate the expected larger 
than usual audience.
My third year was a shambles.
Lacking a classical background I 
had to take the History of Modern
Philosophy option for Part II, which,
with the exception of David Hume, 
held little interest for me. This lack 
of interest and motivation, allied to 
a delightful, but time-consuming and
emotionally demanding love affair with
an undergraduate from Newnham 
(no, reader, I did not marry her), 
denied me my hat-trick of Firsts. 
When I left, the number of students
was gradually increasing in the faculty,
but not the staff, and for two academic
years I was Moral Sciences Supervisor
for Jesus and Caius. During term, 
I drove down from London early on
Saturday mornings, and spent the day 
in supervisions with my students, before
driving back to my pad in the then
poorest part of Chelsea (aptly named
‘The World’s End’!). I’m sure that such a
situation would not be tolerated today!
For more than ten years after I left
Cambridge, in addition to my full-time
job in publishing, I taught evening
classes in philosophy for the Extra-
Mural Boards of Cambridge, London
and, subsequently, Oxford Universities.
The wheel had turned full circle and 
my debt had been repaid.
Sidney A. (Joe) Josephs (1933–2008)
read Moral Sciences at Trinity
1957–1960.
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appreciation of beauty. This thesis
ensured that, unlike the writings of
most moral philosophers, Moore’s
work had an impact which reached
beyond the academic world into 
the broader culture of writers and
artists, most notably the members 
of the Bloomsbury Group, many of
whom had been friends with Moore
at Cambridge.
Moore left Cambridge in 1904, 
but returned in 1911 to a University
lectureship in Moral Sciences and
then stayed on in Cambridge for 
most of the rest of his life. In 1925 
he was appointed Professor of 
Mental Philosophy and Logic and
elected to a Fellowship at Trinity
College. The main field of Moore’s
work lay in the development of a 
new conception of philosophy as 
the analysis of common sense. 
Moore had been one of the first 
to recognise that Russell’s logical
theory transformed the possibilities
for philosophical analysis. But Moore
also recognised the importance of
respecting the distinctions which we
find in ordinary language, and this
chimed with the thesis of his famous
paper ‘A Defence of Common Sense’
(1925) that our common sense view
of the world is largely right. Moore
does not attempt to justify this thesis;
what he emphasizes instead is that it
remains to be determined by analysis
just what it involves. Similarly Moore
holds that we have no grounds to
doubt our common sense belief that
we know such things as ‘This is a
hand’; but, he accepts, it remains 
to be determined just how sceptical
arguments which question our 
claims to this knowledge are to 
be countered.
Moore retired in 1939 and spent
the war years in the USA where he
made a considerable impact. He 
died on October 24th 1958, and 
his ashes are buried in what used 
to be known as St. Giles cemetery 
but is now known as Ascension
Parish Burial Ground. While his
influence on academic philosophy
continues in contemporary debates
which involve ‘Moorean’ positions,
through the impact of his personality
he also left an enduring legacy in 
the way in which philosophical
discussion is conducted. Here is
Gilbert Ryle describing his experience
of meeting Moore, the eminent
professor of philosopher, when he,
Ryle, was starting his career:
For some of us there still lives 
the Moore whose voice is never 
quite resuscitated by his printed
words. ... He gave us courage
not by making concessions, but
by making no concessions to
our youth or to our shyness. He
would explode at our mistakes
and muddles with just that
genial ferocity with which he
would explode at the mistakes
and muddles of philosophical
high-ups, and with just the
genial ferocity with which he
would explode at mistakes and
muddles of his own. He would
listen with minute attention 
to what we said, and then,
without a trace of discourtesy 
or courtesy, treat our remarks
simply on their merits …
sometimes, without a trace 
of politeness or patronage,
crediting them with whatever
positive utility he thought they
possessed. 
(from ‘G. E. Moore’ Collected
Papers Vol. I., Hutchinson,
1971 p. 270).
Thomas Baldwin is Professor of
Philosophy, University of York. 
He read Moral Sciences at Trinity
(1965–8) and was University
Lecturer in Philosophy at
Cambridge (1984–94).
In 2008, the 50th anniversary of 
his death, the Philosophy Faculty
celebrated the life and achievements
of G. E. Moore (1873–1958). 
Moore came to Cambridge, to 
Trinity College, in 1892 to study
classics, but philosophy soon 
became his main interest and in 
1896 he achieved a first class result 
in Part II of the Moral Sciences
Tripos. Moore’s interest in philosophy
had been stimulated by new friends
such as Bertrand Russell who later
wrote: ‘In my third year I met G. E.
Moore, who was then a freshman,
and for some years he fulfilled my
ideal of genius. He was in those 
days beautiful and slim, with a look
almost of inspiration, and with an
intellect as deeply passionate as
Spinoza’s’ (Autobiography,
Routledge 1998 p. 61).
In 1898 Moore won a Prize
Fellowship at Trinity College and his
next six years there were the most
productive period of his life. His main
achievements were his ‘refutation 
of idealism’ and, especially, his 
ethical treatise Principia Ethica.
Moore argues here that ethics, the
study of the good, is an autonomous
discipline, separate from both idealist
metaphysics and natural science.
Goodness is a sui generis property; it
is neither a fundamental metaphysical
or natural property, nor definable 
in terms of them. Many different
kinds of thing are good, but, Moore
famously affirms, by far the most
valuable things which we know 
or can imagine are love and the
G. E. Moore
G.E. Moore and Cambridge Philosophy
Thomas Baldwin
Thomas Baldwin speaking at the Alumni
Weekend, 2008
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Faculty events
Onora O’Neill on Press
Freedom
Xiaoxu Chen
On October 22nd 2008, Professor
Onora O’Neill gave a public lecture
on Press Freedom as part of the
Festival of Ideas. Professor O’Neill
asked: Why has the concept of 
‘press freedom’ seen so little criticism 
since the European enlightenment?
What kind of justification can we
provide for a conception of press
freedom? 
She started by clarifying some
conceptual confusions. The terms
‘press freedom’, ‘freedom of speech’
and ‘freedom of expression’ are
frequently misused, and often
conflated. Although these concepts
are related, they are not one and 
the same thing, as people often
assume.
Having done this, Professor
O’Neill argued that history has
shown the classic justifications 
for press freedom provided by 
Milton and Mill to be inadequate. 
We cannot agree with Milton that
individual freedom of expression 
is the key to truth. Nor, in light 
of the pervasive market power 
of the press, can we endorse Mill’s
optimistic view that press freedom 
is always the best guarantee of
individuals’ interests, both in 
free expression and in more
substantive goods.
In light of that deep connection
between press institutions and 
market power, what can best justify
press freedom? Professor O’Neill
suggested that the best justification 
is probably that a free press
contributes to democracy. This
justification does not mandate 
a complete laissez-faire attitude, 
since it fails unless we put in place
measures to resist monopolies and 
the concentration of ownership.
Professor O’Neill concluded by
discussing the difficulties of using
both statutory and non-statutory
regulation to guarantee this
precarious balance.
Cambridge Graduate
Conference
On the weekend of the 17th/18th
January 2009, St John’s College 
was home to the second edition 
of the Cambridge Graduate
Conference in the Philosophy 
of Logic and Mathematics. The
conference offers a forum – the 
only of its kind in the UK – in which
postgraduate students working in 
the areas of logic and the philosophy
of mathematics can present their
research to a specialist audience. 
The conference attracted delegates
from all over Europe and saw a
number of stimulating papers on
topics ranging from the logic of
counterfactuals and nominalism 
in the philosophy of mathematics 
to questions of ontological
commitment. In the ensuing, 
often lively discussions, the speakers
benefited from the comments and
criticisms of their respondents, of 
the audience (including a number 
of Faculty members) and of our 
two extremely engaged and engaging
keynote speakers, Professor Hannes
Leitgeb (Bristol) and Professor
Timothy Williamson (Oxford). 
Both days culminated in a 
keynote address. Professor Leitgeb
presented a thought-provoking 
paper laying down the prolegomena
to a serious study of the notion of
informal provability in mathematics.
In the final talk, Professor Williamson
drew a number of intriguing
metaphysical conclusions from 
a study of the semantics of second-
order modal logic. 
Apart from the many interesting
contributions, there was also 
plenty of opportunity to mingle 
and exchange ideas over coffee or 
red wine. We hope the Cambridge
Graduate Conference in the
Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics
will be firmly established in the 
years to come. 
Luca Incurvati and Florian
Steinberger, Graduate Students
Third Routledge Lecture: 
Iris Murdoch and the
Rejection of Existentialism
Laura Biron
In this year’s Routledge lecture on 
30th October 2008, Professor Richard
Moran (Harvard) argued that the
standard account of Iris Murdoch’s
battle with existentialism — a simple
tale of youthful embrace followed by
mature rejection — was wrong both
about existentialism and about the
direction of Murdoch’s thought. It 
was wrong about existentialism, he
suggested, because the passion and
breadth of her polemical critique in 
The Sovereignty of Good led her to
caricature and distort the theory. And it
was wrong about Murdoch’s thought
because, he conjectured, a greater
appreciation of her (downplayed)
existentialist inheritance could
illuminate our understanding of 
some characteristic themes in her 
moral philosophy.
To illustrate his second thesis, 
Moran asked us to revisit Murdoch’s
famous example of a change of vision 
in Sovereignty (the mother-in-law case)
and interpret it using some existentialist
tools of analysis, aiming to show that
Murdoch’s metaphor of vision — a
corrective to the ‘giddy, empty’ will of
existentialist man — was in fact a crucial
part of existentialism’s positive account
of moral growth and responsibility. It
was a subtle and insightful hypothesis.
But those in the audience resistant to 
it felt that it did not accommodate
Murdoch’s famous insistence, against 
the existentialists, that moral growth
requires an orientation of will towards
the Real outside the self, which is an
important part of her own interpretation
of the case at hand. Regardless of this
concern, Moran certainly convinced us
of his first thesis, arguing persuasively
that Murdoch’s less than charitable
depiction of existentialism was overly
harsh and often misrepresented its
target. After all, as he noted, great critics
are often prone inadvertently to distort
what they attack. It is the task of
contemporary interpreters to piece
together the parts of the attack more
carefully, revealing, as Moran did, more
complexity than initially meets the eye.
Festival of Ideas
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The Cambridge Apostles
Peter Marris
One day, out of the blue, I received 
an invitation to a cocktail party in
King’s College. King’s, at that time,
was known for its self-consciously
gay culture, affected by a clique 
of dons and students. The party
included some of these, but the guests
came from all over the university, and
its tone was different. Some of the
guests were famous. I spent ten or
fifteen minutes outlining my theory 
of the novel to E.M. Forster, who
listened politely, and when I had
come to an end, said only “I must
think about that.” Despite this, or
perhaps even because of it, a few 
days later I was invited to join the
Apostles. The party, it turned out,
had been an interview in disguise.
Formally, the society was called the
‘Cambridge Conversazione Society’,
and under this name it booked its
annual dinners at Kettner’s restaurant
in Soho. But it was known as the
Apostles, because at any one time
there could only be twelve
undergraduate members. Any
member who had graduated could
attend its meetings. Noel Annan, 
who later became master of King’s,
came regularly, Eric Hobsbawm, 
the historian, sometimes, E.M.
Forster occasionally. We met to
discuss ideas, and always began 
with a bit of Hegelian play acting,
dating I guess, from the previous
century, in which the phenomenal
world was dismissed, and the real
world of pure reason reinstated. This
was symbolized by eating anchovies
on toast, and calling them ‘whales’.
Then someone would read a paper,
undergraduate or senior member, 
and we would sit in a circle around
the fireplace and discuss it. 
Occasionally we would read 
a famous paper from the past,
preserved in the society’s archives.
The topics ranged from ethical and
philosophical dilemmas to questions
of etiquette, and the papers could 
be serious or playful. The essential
criterion was that they not be
academic, but written to raise
questions that the members from
many different disciplines would be
interested to discuss. For this reason,
the society did not necessarily recruit
the most brilliant undergraduates, but
those who seemed to fit best the ideal
of an intellectually curious thinker,
happy to take up all sorts of ideas
and discuss them for the pleasure of
it. If the society had a larger purpose,
it was to foster a broad intellectual
culture, overriding academic
specialization. But it would have 
been against the spirit of the 
meetings to be solemn about it.
The society was secret. Since
membership was so restricted, it 
did not want potential recruits
lobbying to join, especially as its
criteria for membership were hard 
to define and selection intuitive. 
Nor, I think, did it want membership
to become a matter of prestige
amongst the undergraduates. It
turned its back, idealistically, on the
phenomenal world of intellectual and
career ambitions. Unlike the secret
societies of Yale, for instance, it was
not intended to create a mutually
supportive network to advance
careers. I never thought to use it 
in that way and I do not know of
anyone who did. Its unworldliness
was genuine, if somewhat precious.
But because it was secret, and
because, at one time or another, it has
included many famous or notorious
members, the Apostles have been
mythologized as a vaguely sinister
elite. They play a leading part, for
instance, in Tony Cape’s ingenious
spy thriller, The Cambridge Theorem,
and at least one of the Apostles 
was, indeed, a spy. The society was
founded in 1820 by a Reverend
Tomlinson, who became Bishop of
Gibraltar, and he intended it, I think,
to promote earnest discussion of
moral questions, such as would
strengthen the spiritual life of 
serious-minded undergraduates. 
The minutes, kept, as I remember,
in a big black tin box, were full of
curious information about famous
and infamous members. Both
Tennyson and his friend Arthur
Hallam belonged. The minutes record
that, when his turn came to make a
presentation, Tennyson was overcome
with a fit of nerves, and threw his
paper in the fire. Later that summer,
they also record, he and Hallam went
off to France to join a revolution. 
An Irish member was hanged by 
the British as a traitor. G.E. Moore,
whose book on ethics was a revered
classic at Cambridge, and Bertrand
Russell were members (Alfred North
Whitehead, with whom Russell wrote
Principia Mathematica, the work
which radically reformulated logic,
declined to join because the society
was secret). But public curiosity 
about the Apostles stems from its
association with the group of writers
and painters who came to be known
as the Bloomsbury set — Lytton
Strachey, his brother John,
Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson, 
J.M. Keynes, and Leonard Woolf 
had all belonged. In my day, E.M.
Forster apart, there were no such
famous figures at our meetings. Eric
Hobsbawm, the historian, was the
best known of the older members
who sometimes attended. 
I attended only one of the society’s
annual dinners. I sat next to Leonard
Woolf, and as the youngest member
present, was required to make a
speech. I do not remember what 
I said, but it was well received. 
As the party broke up, I was
offered a lift home by Guy Burgess,
who was, as I understood, connected
to the Foreign Office. Something
about him, at once aggressive and
insinuating, made me uneasy. When
we reached the horse pond at the top
of Hampstead Hill, I asked him to let
me out, pretending that I was only a
few steps from my house. Some years
later, he was discovered to have spied
for the Soviet government, and fled 
to Moscow. How was someone who
seemed so obviously untrustworthy,
even on first acquaintance, ever let
near an official secret?
Peter Marris, (1927–2007) read
Moral Sciences at Clare 1948–1951.
He became a sociologist and the
author of nine books.
Peter Marris in 1949
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Faculty News
Awards
One of the world’s most prestigious
academic societies has elected Professor
Simon Blackburn to its membership 
in its latest round of appointments. 
He has been made a Foreign Honorary
Member of the American Academy 
of Arts and Sciences.
Departures
Professor Quassim Cassam took 
up a professorship at the University 
of Warwick on 1st January 2009.
Temporary lecturer Dr Karen Nielsen
returned to her post at the University
of Western Ontario, Canada.
Arrivals
This year the Faculty welcomed
Professor Bob Hanna from the
University of Colorado, Boulder, and
Dr Sophia Connell, from Newnham
College, Cambridge, as temporary
lecturers.
Professor Tim Crane (philosophy 
of mind, metaphysics, philosophy 
of psychology), who has taught at
University College London since 
1990, and where he is currently 
Head of Department, has accepted 
the Knightbridge Professorship with
effect from 1st September 2009.
Established in 1683, this is one 
of the oldest professorships at 
the University of Cambridge.
Dr Fraser MacBride, Reader in
Philosophy at Birkbeck College,
University of London, has accepted 
a permanent post to commence 
in October 2009. His interests 
are metaphysics, philosophy of
mathematics, philosophical logic 
and the history of analytic philosophy.
JRF Elections
Among our current research students,
Luca Incurvati was elected to a Junior
Research Fellowship at Magdalene
College, Cambridge. Charlotte Werndl
has accepted a Research Fellowship 
at Queen’s College, Oxford.
Lectures
The Faculty participated in the 
Festival of Ideas by putting on two
enormously successful lectures
(reviewed on page 5). This was 
the first ever festival of its kind to
celebrate the arts, humanities and 
social sciences, both at the university
and in the UK.
Professor Jane Heal visited Japan in
2008 and was invited to lecture at the
Philosophy Departments at Keio
University, Tokyo and Kyoto University.
Student Prizes
The new Craig Taylor prize fund 
is for best performance in part IB 
and Part II of the Philosophy tripos.
The Part IB prize was awarded to
Konstancja Duff (Fitzwilliam).
Andreas Morgensen (Fitzwilliam) 
was awarded the Part II prize.
The Matthew Buncombe prize for 
the best overall performance in the
MPhil degree was awarded to Emily
Caddick (Newnham).
Recent Major Publications 
by Members of the Faculty
Simon Blackburn
How to Read Hume. London:
Granta, 2008.
Raymond Geuss
Philosophy and Real Politics.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 2008.
Robert Hanna & Michelle Maiese
Embodied Minds in Action. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2009.
Michael Potter
Wittgenstein’s notes on logic
Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008.
Faculty Appeal
The Faculty has now raised over 
£1.4 million of the £2 million it 
needs to provide a Trust Fund. If it 
is successful, the Faculty expects to
guarantee that the Professorship of
Philosophy (1896), the Chair held by
Wittgenstein among others, is filled 
in perpetuity. The Faculty is also keen 
to undertake new initiatives, such as
offering studentships, or supporting
distinguished visitors. Your support
would be warmly appreciated. More
information about the appeal and a
donation form is available from the
Faculty website www.phil.cam.ac.uk.
Future 
Faculty Events
Alumni Weekend 2009
The Meaning of Music
Saturday 26 September
Professor Roger Scruton
Why do we think that music has
meaning, and how does this bear
on the value of music and its 
place in our lives?
Exhibition: 800 years of
Philosophy at Cambridge
25–26 September
Casimir Lewy Library
Exhibition to celebrate the history 
of Philosophy at Cambridge.
Please see Alumni Weekend 2009
booklet for further details.
Festival Of Ideas 
21 October–1 November 2009
The Philosophy of Wine –
From Science to Subjectivity
Professor Barry Smith, Director 
of the Institute of Philosophy,
University of London.
Can our taste experiences reveal
the objective qualities of a wine, or
do they just confirm our individual
preferences?
Routledge Lecture: The
Open-Doors Model of
Freedom
30 October
Professor Philip Pettit, the Laurance
S. Rockefeller University Professor 
of Politics and Human Values at
Princeton University, will deliver 
the fourth Routledge Lecture.
Please see the Festival of Ideas
brochure for further details.
Jonathon Brown’s gift of a painting was
unveiled at the Alumni Weekend, 2008
consistent! But how do we know . . . ?) Arif Ahmed, an ex-
mathematician, like Michael and myself, is seriously interested 
in issues like the supposed necessity of logic and mathematics.
Bob Hanna, who is temporarily with us this year, also has
equally strong interests in the philosophy of mathematics. 
And then Fraser MacBride, who is joining us in October, has
written a number of major articles in the area. Those who like 
to see continuities will think that it entirely appropriate that 
the Cambridge of Russell and Whitehead, of Ramsey and 
Turing, and of Wittgenstein, should still care a very great 
deal about the foundations of logic and mathematics.
This cluster attracts an impressive bunch of enthusiastic
graduate students interested in the philosophy of mathematics
(who have done exceptionally well in competitions for Junior
Research Fellowships).
For some reason, these students have tended to be more
inclined than others to spend their days working together in 
the graduate centre, which has made for a terrific atmosphere 
of co-operative endeavour. The Thursday Logic Seminar,
followed by the pub, has become something of an institution 
(if mathematicians are engines for turning coffee into theorems,
philosophers of mathematics do seem to flourish more on beer).
Many of us get together another day as well — sometimes to
teach ourselves more logic by working through some advanced
text, but this year (at Bob Hanna’s instigation) it’s been to 
discuss recent major books on the philosophy of mathematics. 
It is not just all very productive, but also a good deal of fun!
Will it continue? The collapse of serious logic teaching in
many British universities (partly because of the dire state of
school mathematics?) means that the number of students
enthused to go on to do graduate work in related areas of
philosophy is in serious decline. Even our own undergraduates
seem less logic-minded than their predecessors. Worrying for us
who think that logic matters. But for the moment, it is good to
report that an area of philosophy at the very heart of the
Cambridge tradition does continue to flourish here.
Dr Peter Smith, Senior Lecturer in Philosophy. He blogs at
logicmatters.blogspot.com 
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A downloadable version of the Newsletter is available
from the Faculty website: http://www.phil.cam.ac.uk/
The deadline for the next issue is 30th January 2010.
British philosophy departments have changed. For the last
twenty years, the pressures have been to give increasing priority
to research and to expand the numbers of research students.
There’s a temptation to devalue other teaching as a result. But 
we like to think that in Cambridge, at any rate, we’ve managed
to balance the competing demands. Despite a radical growth in
student numbers, we maintain a gold-standard undergraduate
education. And while we’ve certainly gone for quality rather
than quantity, our graduate school is expanding and impressively
flourishing.
How do we continue to maintain research quality and 
attract the best graduate students, despite being a relatively 
small department? By developing strengths in particular areas, 
by having a number of ‘research clusters’ (in the jargon of the
age). This focus is good for our research — as there is the
ongoing stimulation from advanced seminars, reading-groups,
and innumerable conversations. And it is even better for our
graduate students — for just the same reasons.
One cluster that’s emerged is in logic and the philosophy 
of mathematics. Michael Potter has produced important books 
on the philosophy of arithmetic, Reason’s Nearest Kin, and Set
Theory and Its Philosophy. Alex Oliver and Timothy Smiley
have written a whole series of influential articles on the logic 
of plurals (which covers, inter alia, the logic of expressions 
like ‘Alex Oliver and Timothy Smiley’), and they have recently
applied that work in arguing for a rather deflationary position
about set theory.
I have a book out on Gödel’s Theorems, and am working 
on another on the consistency of arithmetic. (Yes, of course it is
Logic Matters
Peter Smith
The Faculty gratefully acknowledges support
for the newsletter from Polity Press. 
